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ABSTRACT:The maritime piracy included a wide variety of associated criminal activities including attack 
and confiscation of vessels and merchandise, imprisonment or torturing of merchants and rulers in sea-
-space in return for ransom money, attack and raiding of coastal trading centers and villages, creation 
of fear and terror in chief channels of navigation and attacking  commercial competitors as a strategy to 
weaken the trading ability and the wealth-mobilizing ability of their rivals. All this applied to coastal south 
west India during the period under study. The merchant chiefs of Cannanore like Mamale Marakkar and later 
under Poca Amame (Pokar Ahamad) and Pocarallee (Pokar Ali) were some of the better known protagonists 
that the Portuguese had to deal with. But the Malabar corsairs had their corresponding English and Sicilian 
corsairs in the Mediterranean.
KEY-WORDS: India, Malabar, Cannanore, piracy, corsairs.
RESUMO: A pirataria no mar incluía variedade de atividades criminosas, tais como ataques e aprendimento 
de barcos e mercadoria, prisão e tortura de mercadores e governantes em troca de resgate, assaltos às 
zonas habitacionais e centros comerciais no litoral, rompimento das principais linhas de navegação e co-
mércio dos rivais. Tudo isto se aplicava no sudoeste da península indiana durante o período aqui analisado. 
Os grandes senhores de comércio de Cannanore, tais como Mamale Marakkar e mais tarde Pokar Ahamad e 
Pokar Ali, eram os protagonistas mais conhecidos destas atividades que desafiaram os Portugueses. Mas os 
corsários do Malabar não eram exceções. Os corsários ingleses e sicilianos no Mediterrâneo faziam igual. 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Índia, Malabar, Cannanore, pirataria, corsários.
1 This is the revised version of an earlier paper presented in the Panel on Piracy in Indian Ocean in the 
Second European Congress of World and Global History, held at Dresden University, Germany, 3rd  - 
5th July, 2008. I thank very specially Prof. Dietmar Rothermund, Sebastian Prange, Patricia Risso and 
Giancarlo Casale for their insightful comments and interventions.  
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Introduction
Pirates, a term deriving from the Latin word pirata and meaning ‘attempt’ or ‘ex-
perience’ denoted principally the social segments trying ‘luck on the sea’ and repre-
sented different categories of people linked with various aspects of criminality com-
mitted in maritime space. With robbery at sea or on the shore as the central aspect, 
maritime piracy included a wide variety of associated criminal activities including 
attack and confiscation of vessels and merchandise, imprisonment or torturing of 
merchants and rulers in sea-space in return for ransom money, attack and raiding of 
coastal trading centers and villages, creation of fear and terror in chief channels of 
navigation and even attacking of the navigational lines of their commercial competi-
tors as a strategy to weaken the trading ability and the wealth-mobilizing ability of 
their rivals. Very often in the context of coastal south west India the category of pira-
tes comprised various segments of people who combined different aspects and strands 
of their trade with elements of corsairing, or guerrilla sea-fighting or privateering. 2
Piratical attacks were common and frequent in zones of seas and shores where 
maritime trade was carried out with intensity and high frequency, but remained re-
latively outside the control of a strong legitimate political authority. Thus during the 
early centuries of Christian era, when trade was carried out in an intensified way in 
Roman empire and in its neighbouring economic zones, there was increasing pirati-
cal attacks on vessels plying in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.3 While the 
Cilician pirates went to the extent of capturing Julius Caesar on his voyage across 
Aegean Sea in 75 B.C. and holding him as a prisoner in the Dodecanese islet of Phar-
macusa demanding twenty talents of gold as ransom, on the west coast of India, the 
pirates of Konkan coast posed severe threats to the Roman vessels conducting trade 
with Lymrike and Ariake. Ptolemy writing in second century AD refers to the region 
located between Ariake (Ariavartam) and Lymrike(Malabar) as region infested by  pi-
rates, whose threat was experienced from Mandagora till Tyndis(Ponnani).4 However 
Pliny says that the pirates operated as far south as Muziris (present day Cranganore of 
2  For details on the different perceptions about corsairs and pirates of this period see M.N.Pearson, 
Coastal Western India: Studies from the Portuguese Records, New Delhi, 1981,pp.18-40; Luis Filipe 
Thomaz, “Portuguese Control on the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal A Comparative Study”, in 
Om Prakash and Denys Lombard(ed.), Commerce and Culture in the Bay of Bengal, Delhi, 1999 ; 
O.K.Nambiar, The Kunjalis, Admirals of Calicut, Delhi, 1963, pp.14-6; John Biddulph, The Pirates of 
Malabar and an Englishwoman in India two Hundred Years Ago, London, 1907( republished by AES, New 
Delhi, 1995); Ana Maria P.Ferreira, O essencial sobre o Corso e a Pirataria, Lisboa, 1985.
3  The island of Lemnos was a haven for Thracian pirates who resisted Greek influence in classical 
antiquity. The Anatolian coast was infested by pirates who used to plunder the vessels conducting trade 
with the various economic zones of the Roman empire.  
4  Ptolemy ,Geografia, 7.1.7.
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Kerala in south India),5 evidently suggesting the role of Malabar corsairs in the entire 
piratical operations along the coastal western India since early antiquity. 
Later when Roman trade declined, the pirates did not disappear from the map of co-
astal south west India, as the expanding Sassanid Persian empire had already begun to 
attract a major chunk of India’s maritime trade from mid-third century onwards. With 
the intensification of maritime trade of south West India with Sassanid Persia, sea pi-
rates trying their luck on the sea began to appear in large numbers in the navigational 
channels to Persian Gulf, necessitating the Sassanid rulers to intervene in the matter 
urgently. Consequently, some time before 415 A.D, as the eleventh century chronicle 
of Seert mentions, a Christian Catholicos, a certain Ahai, was deputed by the Sassanid 
ruler Yasdigird I(399-421) to investigate the problem of piratical attacks on the ships 
returning from India and Ceylon to Persian Gulf. 6 It seems that the choice of the Chur-
ch dignitary for the purpose of containing sea-piracy must have been made because 
of his ability to mobilize the support of Christian mercantile settlers of the west coast 
of India for countering the attacks of the pirates.7 By the end of thirteenth century 
Marco Polo had seen Malabari pirates who used to travel in large numbers along with 
their family members attacking and plundering merchant vessels as far as the coast of 
Gujarat.8 During the medieval period Ezhimala or Mount Eli near Cannanore was said 
to have been the haven for the Malabari pirates for a very long period of time.
However the geographical discoveries and the consequent intensification of mari-
time trade in the Indian Ocean in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries witnessed 
the entry of a large number of people, particularly from the coastal villages of Kerala, 
into the maritime space of Indian Ocean as sea pirates. While some of them seem to 
have been the descendants of the traditional pirate families, a good many of them 
were traditional merchants, who were displaced from the commercial world due to 
the monopolistic trading policies maintained by the Portuguese and the early Europe-
an commercial companies. The displaced traditional merchants were either compel-
led to become corsairs or were so labeled and categorized by the European commer-
cial powers in their attempts to legitimize their attempts to eliminate them from the 
world of commerce. However much greater was the number of people who turned out 
5  Pliny, 6.103-5.
6  Addai Scher, La Chronique de Seert in Patrologia Orientalis, V, pp.324-6; B.E.Colles, “ Persian Merchants 
and Missionaries in Medieval Malaya”, pp.10-47 , especially p.18; D. Whitehouse and A.Williamson, 
“Sassanian Maritime Trade”, in Iran, 11, 1973, pp.29-47. 
7  Pius Malekandathil,  “The Sassanids and the Maritime Trade of India during the Early Medieval Period” 
The Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, Amritsar, 2003, pp. 156-173; For more details see Pius 
Malekandathil, Maritime India: Trade, Religion and Polity in the Indian Ocean, New Delhi, 2010,pp.2-4.
8  Marco Polo, The Book of Ser Marco Polo the Venetian Concerning the Kingdom and the Marvels of the 
East, edited by Henry Yule,  vol.I, London, 1903.
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to be pirates in their attempts to trying their luck on the sea against the backdrop of 
intensified maritime trade carried out by European powers. Though a good number of 
these pirates disappeared from the annals of history with their individual or collective 
defeats, a few of them made immense fortunes out of corsair activities, which they 
eventually translated into political assets, legitimately ensuring for them acceptabili-
ty in the mainstream world order.  
The central purpose of this paper is to examine the nature of piracy and different 
aspects of criminality that appeared in the coastal waters of south West India during 
the age of European commercial expansion and also to see the different mechanisms 
and devices by which some of these pirates secured legitimacy and sanction for their 
upward mobility in social, economic and political ladder. This is further analyzed by 
examining the nature and content of piratical activities of this period both as percei-
ved by the Europeans and by the locals and also by looking into the extent of political 
ambitions that the leading corsairs were able to materialize for the purpose of ensu-
ring justifiable entry into a legitimate world order.  
The Portuguese Perception of Piracy and Criminality
The Portuguese who secured for themselves the supremacy and lordship over Indian 
Ocean initially because of the allocation of the eastern space of the world to the Por-
tuguese by Pope in 1493 (by the treaty of Tordesillas)9 and later confirmed by way of 
the discovery of direct sea-route to India, constructed a certain set of norms and pre-
cepts by which the notions of legality and criminality were re-defined and re-drawn in 
coastal south west India and in other zones of Indian Ocean that were brought under 
their control. They maintained that Pope being the vicar of Christ was the legitimate 
authority on earth to divide and allocate world to the political powers (including the 
maritime space of Indian Ocean) and that the East and its sea waters conferred upon 
them by the Popes through papal Bulls and the treaty of Tordesillas, were exclusively 
under their jurisdiction and any activity carried out against their political and eco-
nomic hold in the East was looked upon as criminality. The Portuguese viewed the 
waters of Indian Ocean  as mare clausum, where only the Portuguese were to have the 
exclusive right to navigation, while it was to remain closed for others.10 No one was 
9  Luis Adão da Fonseca and Jose Manuel Ruiz Asenzio(ed.), Corpus Documental del Tratado de Tordesillas, 
Valladolid, 1995, doc.75, 76, 77 and 99, pp.119-30; 137-9. 
10  For details see C.H.Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the East 
Indies, Oxford, 1967; Cornelius van Vollenhoven, Three Stages in the Evolution of International Law, 
The Hague, 1919; Arthur Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations, 2nd ed., New York, 1947; 
K.S.Mathew, “Portuguese Trade with India and the theory of Royal Monopoly in the Sixteenth Century”, 
in The Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, Waltair, 1979, pp.389-96:  Richard Tuck,  Philosophy 
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allowed to ply in the maritime space of Indian Ocean without the Portuguese written 
permission given in the form of licences or cartazes.11 
As per the conceptualizations of mare clausum, legality meant only those activities 
and schemes that ultimately used to subserve the political and commercial interests 
of the Portuguese and anything that stood against the designs of the Portuguese was 
branded as illegal and criminal deed. Accordingly legal trade meant commerce carried 
out with the permission and licences or cartazes from the Portuguese, while any one 
conducting trade and navigation in the Indian Ocean without Portuguese permission 
was called a smuggler and any one challenging the supremacy of the Portuguese over 
Indian Ocean or the use of force to resist Portuguese intervention in pursuing their 
trading activities fetched for them the label of pirates and corsairs. Thus the Portu-
guese perception of Indian Ocean as mare clausum and their claims of navigational 
and commercial monopoly in this maritime space were highly instrumental in labelling 
a wide variety of sea-related activities of the local coastal people within the category 
of criminality and piracy. However this should not make one underestimate the di-
mensions of brutal and violent corsair activities that were equally rampant along the 
south west coast of India during this period. 
Any venture or fight against the monopolistic commercial policies of the Portuguese, 
that left little outlet for the legitimate trade of the indigenous merchants was often 
categorized as “cossarios” or having engaged in “cossairo” activity, as in the case 
of Pate Marakkar,12 Kunjali Marakkar13 and Ale Abraem.14 Some historians view these 
people who fought against the Portuguese as patriots and nationalists,15 while some 
others like M.N. Pearson regard them as something between pirate and privateer.  He 
rightly points out that some of them were pirates, while some others were corsairs, or 
guerrilla warriors and many others were inoffensive traders.16 However the Portugue-
se, who registered their authority over the waters of Indian Ocean through the devi-
and Government: 1572-1651, New York, 1993. 
11  Luis Filipe Thomaz, “ Portuguese Control on the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal-A Comparative Study 
”, in Om Prakash and Denys Lombard(ed.), Commerce and Culture in the Bay of Bengal, Delhi, 1999; 
Luis Filipe Thomaz, “Precedents and Parallels of the Portuguese Cartaz System”, in Pius Malekandathil 
and Jamal Mohammed(ed.), The Portuguese, Indian Ocean and European Bridgeheads, Fundação 
Oriente, Lisboa/Tellicherry, 2001, pp.67-85.
12  João de Barros, Decadas da Asia,  Lisboa, 1945, IV-viii-12.
13  Diogo do Couto, Decadas da Asia dos feitos que os Portuguezes fizeram na Conquista e Descobrimento 
das Terras e Mares do Oriente, Lisboa, 1975, V,-ii-4.
14  Ibid. For more details on the various aspects of fight between the two see Gaspar Correia, Lendas 
da India, tom.III, Porto, 1975, pp.818-37; tom.IV, pp.77-84; Fernão Lopes Castanheda, Historia do 
descobrimento e conquista da India pelos Portugueses, Coimbra, 1924 , VIII, pp.173-6.
15  O.K.Nambiar, The Kunjalis: Admirals of Calicut, Delhi, 1963.
16  M.N.Pearson, Coastal Western India, New Delhi, pp.25-6.
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ces of regular coastal patrolling and cartaz system, viewed everybody who challenged 
their navigational lines as corsair.17  
Initially the Portuguese noticed criminal elements only among the paradesi al-Karmi 
Muslim merchants, who used to transship commodities to the eastern Mediterranean 
through Red-Sea route, challenging the commercial and maritime supremacy of the 
Portuguese and undermining the monopoly claims of the Portuguese crown.18 Howe-
ver, though these paradesi al-Karimi merchants were their commercial competitors 
and often referred to as “enemies of faith”, they were not described as corsairs or 
pirates. That they were not categorized as corsairs or pirates is suggestive of the 
fact that the Portuguese still considered them as traders and merchants, in spite of 
frequent attacks on them as enemies. However the local Muslim traders like the Ma-
rakkars and the Mappilas were initially looked upon as commercial collaborators and 
supporters of the Portuguese, as they who used to procure food materials needed for 
their settlements and cargo for their Lisbon-bound vessels.19
From Traders to Corsairs
The Portuguese experienced increasing threat of piratical attacks from the second 
and third decades of the sixteenth century. It started initially with the entry of the 
17  Though cartaz system was introduced from 1502 onwards, the traders who collaborated with the 
Portuguese initially were conceded greater amount of freedom in the movement of commodities within 
Asia, as a mechanism to ensure their co-operation. However, only after 1509 with the larger centralized 
imperial designs chalked out by Afonso Albuquerque that the coastal patrolling and rigorous checking 
of cartaz seem to have become frequent. Consequently all the native ships had to take cartazes which 
contained such details as the name of the vessel and of the captain, the nature of the cargo, its 
origin and destination as well as the name of the authority issuing the cartaz. For details see Pius 
Malekandathil, Portuguese Cochin and the Maritime Trade of India:1500-1663( A Volume in the South 
Asian Study Series of Heidelberg University, Germany), Delhi, 2001, pp.125-126;220-221; For more 
details on cartaz see Luis Filipe Thomaz, “Portuguese Control on the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Begal 
: A Comparative Study”, in Om Prakash and Denys Lombard(ed.), Commerce and Culture in the Bay of 
Bengal, Delhi, 1999. For a much nuanced discussion on piracy during the age of Portuguese commercial 
expansion see Luis de Albuquerque, “Casos da expansão portuguesa”, in Estudos de Historia, vol.V, 
Coimbra, 1977, pp.278-95.
18  Pius Malekandathil, “Merchants, Markets and Commodities: Some Aspects of Portuguese Commerce 
with Malabar”, in Pius Malekandathil and Jamal Mohammed(ed.), The Portuguese, Indian Ocean and 
European Bridgeheads: Festschrift in Honour of Prof. K.S.Mathew, Fundacão Oriente, Lisbon/MESHAR, 
Tellicherry, 2001, pp. 242-3; For details on al-Karimis see  Walter J. Fischel, “The Spice Trade in 
Mamluk Egypt”, in the Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, vol.I, Leiden, 1958; 
Eliyahu Ashtor, “The Venetian Supremacy in Levantine Trade:Monopoly of Pre-colonialism”, in Journal 
of European Economic History, vol.III, Rome, 1974; Pius Malekandathil, “From Merchant Capitalists to 
Corsairs: The Role of Muslim Merchants in Portuguese Maritime Trade of the Portuguese” in Portuguese 
Studies Review(Canada), 12(1), 2004,pp. 77-80.
19  As Gavetas da Torre do Tombo, tom.IV,Lisboa, 1964,p.132; R.A. de Bulhão Pato(ed.), Cartas, de 
Affonso de Albuquerque seguidas de documentos que as elucidam,tom.I, Lisboa, 1884, p.320;tom.II, 
p.361;tom.V,pp.503-504; Gaspar Correia, Lendas da India, tom.I, pp. 430 - 431.
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Portuguese for increasing movement of commodities through the main channels of 
navigation along the coast of south west India both for Asian trade as well as for 
Indo-European commerce.  Many who wanted to draw easy wealth out of these na-
vigational lines and out of the initial phase of Portuguese sea-borne trade began to 
resort to corsair activities in a significant degree during this period.20 Eventually many 
of the local Muslim traders including the Marakkars and the Mappilas, on getting their 
relationship with the Portuguese strained by 1520, also started resorting to a package 
in which corsair activities formed an important component of their programmes of 
trade. In fact the commercial relationship of the Marakkar traders with the Portugue-
se had strained during the post-Albuquerquian period, when the Portuguese casado 
private traders began to emerge as the favoured merchant group for the official Lu-
sitanians in the Indian Ocean.  After the death of Affonso Albuquerque, the lobbying 
group of private traders among the Portuguese settlers of Cochin got upper hand, 
under whose pressure the Portuguese officials began to target at the Marakkar traders 
with a view to weakening the commercial strength of the latter and thus facilitating 
an easy emergence for the mercantile community of the casados in their stead. 21
The documents say that by the beginning of the third decade of the sixteenth cen-
tury a considerable number of the Portuguese-friendly Muslims from the Marakkar and 
Mappila clans turned out to be pirates and started attacking Portuguese vessels with 
vehemence following the Portuguese high-handedness in the waters of South West 
India.22 In fact the Marakkar traders, who were one time suppliers of spices and mer-
cantile collaborators for the Portuguese, underwent radical transformation from 1513 
onwards and particularly during the post-Albuquerquian period. The developments of 
1513, when paradesi and al-Karimi merchants fled en masse from Calicut to the ports 
of Gujarat, Vijayanagara, Hormuz and the Red Sea, following the establishment of a 
Portuguese base in that city after having poisoned the reigning Zamorin and installed 
in Calicut a pro-Lusitanian ruler in his stead, 23 favoured the commercial activities of 
20  The evident case is of Timoja who said to have engaged in corsair activities by Duarte Barbosa. For 
details see Maria Augusta da Veiga e Souza(ed.),  O Livro de Duarte Barbosa(Edicção critica e anotada), 
vol.II, Lisboa, 2000, pp.36-7.  
21  Cf. Vitor Luis Gaspar Rodrigues, “O Grupo de Cochin e a Oposição a Afonso de Albuquerque:, in Studia, 
51, Lisboa, 1992, pp.119-144; Luis Filipe Thomaz, “ Diogo Pereira, O Malabar”, in Mare Liberum, 5, 
1993, pp.49-64; Genevieve Bouchon and Luis Filipe Thomaz(ed.), Voyage dans Les Deltas du Gange et 
de l’Irraouaddy. Relation Portugaise Anonyme(1521), Paris, 1988, pp.58-68; Sanjay Subrahmanyam, 
The Portuguese Empire in Asia 1500-1700: A Political and Economic History, London, 1993, p.97; Maria 
Emilia Madeira Santos, “ Afonso de Albuquerque e os feitores”, in Actas do II Seminario Internacional 
de Historia Indo-Portuguesa, ed. by Luis de Albuquerque and Inacio Guerreiro, Lisboa, 1985, pp.201-20; 
Pius Malekandathil, “The Portuguese Casados and the Intra-Asian Trade: 1500-1663”, in Proceedings of 
the Indian History Congress, Millenium (61st) Session, Kolkata, 2001,pp.384-5.
22  João de Barros, Decadas da Asia,  IV-viii-12; Diogo do Couto, Decadas da Asia dos feitos que os 
Portuguezes fizeram na Conquista e Descobrimento das Terras e Mares do Oriente, V,-ii-4.
23 ANTT, Chancelaria de Manuel I, liv.II, fol.83 “Capitulos de pazes entre Afonso de Albuquerque e o Samo-
62 
Fluxos & Riscos  n.º1, 2010
the Marakkars who eventually started appropriating the trade of the al-Karimis and 
began to transship spices from Kerala to the ports of the Red Sea. The commercial 
vacuum created in the navigational lines of maritime Kerala and the ports of Red 
Sea by the exodus of the al-Karimis played a vital role in the transformation of the 
Marakkar Muslims from being coastal traders to long-distance traders linked with the 
Red Sea ports. The Ottomans, who occupied Egypt in 1516/7 displacing Mamluks and 
their commercial allies, the al-Karimis,24 began to increasingly bank upon Marakkar 
traders for obtaining Indian spices.25 However when the Portuguese officials started 
attacking the Marakkar vessels and confiscating their cargo destined to Red Sea ports 
with a view to protecting the royal monopoly trade and at times for facilitating the 
commerce of the emerging casado  traders, the commodity movements of the local 
Muslim merchants began to get increasingly disturbed and blocked.  It was against 
this background that one would understand the nuanced situation of the Marakkar 
merchant Kuti Ali who made arrangements to send pepper to Red sea with the help of 
Portuguese governor Diogo Lopes Sequeira was attacked by the governor himself and 
his cargo was confiscated. 26  
Being dissatisfied with such Portuguese behaviour and seeing the prospects of tra-
ding with the Ottomans in a far better way through Calicut, the leading Muslim mer-
chants of Cochin including Kunjali Marakkar, his brother Ahmad Marakkar, their uncle 
Muhammadali Marakkar and their dependents shifted their base of operations from 
Cochin to Calicut by 1524 and began to conduct trade with Red Sea ports, besides 
resorting to guerrilla warfare against the Lusitanians.27 Not later, Pate Marakkar, who 
had been a great friend and collaborator of the Portuguese in their initial days of tra-
de also turned out to be a corsair and went to Calicut to join his nephew, Kunjali Ma-
rakkar, when his two ships sent to Cambay were captured by the Portuguese officials.28 
rin de Calicut”, Lisboa, 26de Fevreiro de 1515; Genevieve Bouchon, “Calicut at the Turn of the Sixteen-
th Century” ”, in The Asian Seas 1550-1800: Local Societies, European Expansion and the Portuguese, 
Revista de Cultura, vol.I, 1987, p.46; R.A. de Bulhão Pato(ed.), Cartas, tom.I,p.126. The Portuguese 
factory of Calicut, set up in 1513, however, was allowed to remain there only till 1525, when the Zamo-
rin pulled it down.
24  For details see Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire, The Classical Age, 1300-1600, London, 1973; 
D.S.Richards(ed.),Islam and the Trade of Asia, Oxford, 1970.
25  Pius Malekandathil, Maritime India: Trade, Religion and Polity in the Indian Ocean, pp. 113-117.
26  R.S.Whiteway, The Rise of Portuguese Power in India:1498-1550, New Delhi,1989, p.196; Pius 
Malekandathil, “Portuguese Casados and the Intra-Asian Trade” p.387.
27  Faria y Souza, Asia Portuguesa: The History of the Discovery and Conquest of India by the Portuguese, 
tran.by John Stevens, vol.I, London, 1695,p.284; Shaykh Zaynuddin, Tuhfat-ul-Mujahidin, tran.
by S.Muhammad Husain Nainar, Madras, 1942,p.66; A.P.Ibrahim Kunju, Studies in Medieval Kerala, 
Trivandrum, 1975,p.60.
28  As Gavetas de Torre do Tombo, vol.X, Lisboa, 1975,p.577; Genevieve Bouchon, “Les Musulmans du 
Kerala a L’Epoque de la Découverte Portugaise”,in Mare Luso-Indicum, II, Paris, 1973”, pp.52-53; Diogo 
Couto, Da Asia dos feitos que os Portuguezes fizeram na Conquista e Descobrimento, Decada V, parte 
2, p.4.
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Meanwhile the Zamorin, who realized that commercial and political relationship that 
he had been maintaining with the Portuguese since 1513 was detrimental to his king-
dom, severed ties with the Portuguese in 1525 and began to bank upon the newly arri-
ved Marakkar merchants for reviving the trade of Calicut. Subsequently, the Marakkar 
clan under the leadership of Kunjali, was entrusted with the task of restructuring the 
commerce of Calicut with the help of his naval power, who got eventually organized 
into a band of privateers, interestingly at a time when the Portuguese casado traders 
were fast penetrating into the principal trade centers of Asian waters.29 Concomi-
tantly commodities from Calicut started entering the Ottoman ports of the Red Sea 
rather significantly, as the Gaspar Correia mentions for 1526 and 1527.30 
The nature of historical processes suggests that though the Marakkar traders initially 
moved as corsairs-cum-traders to Calicut, under the compulsions of the historical 
exigencies they eventually got organized into a band of privateers by the Zamorin by 
incorporating their navigational and commercial expertise for his political purposes. 
Thanks to the intervention through the stately powers of Calicut, these Marakkars got 
eventually transformed from being quasi sea-robbers acting on their own accord to 
being privateers serving the cause of a state. Usually the privateers also used similar 
methods as those of pirates, however they held commission or letter of marque from 
a government or monarch authorizing the capture of merchant ships belonging to an 
enemy nation.31 Though the aspects of privateering were seen very much among their 
activities, the Marakkars seem to have operated as something between pirate and 
privateers.  The type of corsair activities resorted to by Kunjali and his men during 
this period had two forms of operations: a) to patrol the west coast of India with the 
tacit or explicit consent of the Zamorin, blockading and plundering the vessels of the 
Portuguese: b) to integrate the native trade net-works for sending spices regularly to 
Red Sea- Venice route. Thus the corsair activity developed by Kunjali Marakkar’s men 
turned out to be an alternative arrangement of trade, where plundering and confisca-
tion of enemy vessels (evidently of the Portuguese) went hand in hand with parallel 
shipment of commodities to the destination of their choice.32
Meanwhile, with the increasing concentration of the Portuguese on the west co-
ast of India, Kunjali’s men started focusing considerably on the Ceylon-Coromandel-
29  Pius Malekandathil, “Portuguese Casados and the Intra-Asian Trade”, pp.387-8. 
30  Gaspar Correia, Lendas da India, tomo III, parte I, pp.274-5. 
31  Luis Filipe Thomaz, “ Portuguese Control on the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal”, pp.2-3.
32  Pius Malekandathil, Portuguese Cochin and the Maritime Trade of India, 1500-1663(A Volume in the 
South Asian Study Series of Heidelberg University, Germany), New Delhi, 2001, pp.131-2. Pyrard de La-
val states that “ the Zamorin has an understanding with all the Malabar pirates and that they give him 
money and pay a tribute underhand”. Albert Gray(ed.), The Voyage of Francois Pyrard of Laval to the 
East Indies, the Maldives,p.357.
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-Malabar trade, which was traditionally a Marakkar monopoly. They were meticulously 
aware of the need for keeping the Gulf of Manar and the coast of Coromandel for 
their commercial operations, that in turn were used as intermediary base for linking 
Malabar ports with those of Red Sea. Meanwhile the Mappila and Marakkar merchants 
of Cannanore initially under the leadership of Mamale (Muhammad Ali) Marakkar and 
later under Poca Amame (Pokar Ahamad), Pocarallee (Pokar Ali) also started diverting 
commodities to Red Sea ports evading the control systems of the Portuguese. They 
used to transship cargo first to Maldives, from where it was further sent along with 
the wares coming from South East Asia through the straits of Karaidu and Haddumati 
to the ports of Red Sea, controlled by the Ottomans.33 The possession of bases outside 
Portuguese control in fact enabled the Muslims of Calicut and Cannanore to join hands 
to evade the Portuguese control systems and to divert commodities to the traditio-
nal Red Sea- Venice route much more effectively. The growing Portuguese presence 
in south west India appeared to be a major menace for their scheme of actions and 
hence the Kunjali’s men began to target at the Portuguese vessels plying in this region 
in greater frequency along with their mercantile settlements of Nagapattinam, São 
Tome and Pulicat .34 In 1527, Pate Marakkar captured near Pulicat a Portuguese ship 
coming from Malacca.35 
The frequent attacks by Kunjali Marakkar, Kuti Ali Marakkar and Pate Markkar posed 
serious challenges to the various navigational lines of the Portuguese. The Portugue-
se for all practical purposes viewed Kunjali’s men as corsairs and their attempts to 
control the pearl trade of Fishery coast and the cinnamon trade of Kotte invited di-
rect confrontations with the men of Kunjali and other Muslim traders, who had been 
conducting trade over there for years. The attribution of the generic label of corsairs 
to them conveniently gave a justifiable and legitimate reason for the Portuguese to 
wage a series of wars against them till these commercial competitors were extermi-
nated. Finally in 1539 Kunjali and his Marakkar allies were chased and defeated by 
the Portuguese at Vedalai and Negombo and the first Kunjali and Pate Marakkar were 
beheaded, shattering temporarily the corsair and privateering networks of Kunjali and 
his allies.36
33 Genevieve Bouchon, Regent of the Sea: Cannanore’s Response to Portuguese Expansion, 1507-1528, 
trans.by Louise Shackley, Delhi, 1988, pp.119,142,161-2; See also Pius Malekandathil, “The Maritime 
Trade of Cannanore and the Global Commercial Revolution in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centu-
ries”, in Cannanore in the Maritime History of India, ed. by M.O.Koshy, Kannur University Publications, 
Kannur, 2002, pp.46-50.
34  João de Barros, Decadas da Asia, Decada IV, parte 4,p.25.
35  Gaspar Correia, Lendas da India, tom.III,Lisboa, 1921, p.235.
36  João de Barros, Decadas da Asia , Decada IV, liv.8, pp.12-14; Diogo Couto, Da  Asia dos feitos que os 
Portuguezes fizeram na Conquista e Descobrimento, Decada V, liv.2,pp. 4-6, 8.
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Merchants, Corsairs and Rulers 
The inability of the Portuguese to maintain trade monopoly followed by the intensi-
fication of private trade by1540s made many social groups of maritime India get asso-
ciated with different socio-economic and political processes stemming from the gains 
of commodity movements. Some of the leading merchants translated their mercantile 
wealth for setting up stately power structures in areas controlled by them under the 
guise of ventures to contain the commercial expansion of the Portuguese. The early 
moves towards this direction were taken by the merchant chief of Cannanore who 
began to accumulate a considerable amount of wealth and power by developing a 
parallel commercial network outside the Lusitanian control systems and by keeping 
Maldives as the base for diversion of merchandise to the Ottoman ports of Red Sea. 
The wealth that the merchant chiefs of Cannanore like Mamale Marakkar and later 
under Poca Amame (Pokar Ahamad) and Pocarallee(Pokar Ali) accumulated by exerci-
sing control over this route was translated into political assets and for creating a kin-
gly status for himself at Cannanore. By the time when Ali Raja came to power(1545) 
following the murder of Pocaralle by Belchior de Sousa, the transformation process 
from being a merchant chief to the head of a state had become almost absolute and 
complete, giving crystallization and concrete shape to his state-formation ventures 
at Cannanore.37  However, the other side of the picture was that with the creation 
of a small Muslim state entity with Cannanore as base, the raja of Kolathunadu who 
had earlier controlled the entire region was cornered to northern territories of Ka-
sargode. 38 Meanwhile, the newly acquired political status earned for Ali Raja, to a 
great extent, the legitimization that he required for the anti-Portuguese activities 
of commercial and political nature. In the changed situation the new Kunjali and his 
men also began to collaborate with Ali Raja in his anti-Portuguese ventures, linking 
the corsair realm with the quasi-legitimate networks of Ali Raja,39 besides the priva-
teering ventures of Zamorin. . 
The collaboration between Ali Raja of Cannanore and Kunjali of Calicut was also evi-
dent in their joint naval and commercial ventures, as in the case of their operations 
in 1564.  In that year, when Ali Raja and his Muslim forces attacked the Portuguese 
37  Diogo Couto, Da Asia, Decada V, parte II, pp.431-7; Gaspar Correia , Lendas da India, tom.I, pp.425ff; 
Genevieve Bouchon, Regent of the Sea, pp.151-75; Pius Malekandathil, “The Maritime Trade of Can-
nanore and the Global Commercial Revolution”, p.44.
38  Albert Gray(ed.), The Voyage of Francois Pyrard of Laval to the East Indies, the Maldives, the Moluccas 
and Brazil, vol.I, London, 1887(AES reprint, New Delhi, 2000), pp.444-5; Genevieve Bouchoin, Regent 
of the Sea, p.173.
39  K.K.N.Kurup, The Ali Rajas of Cannanore, Trivandrum, 1975: See Pyrard of Laval who refers to Ali Raja 
as being honoured and respected by merchants and corsairs.  Pyrard de Laval, The Voyage of Francois 
Pyrard of Laval, pp.352; .445.
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fort of Cannanore, Kunjali and his men took elements of conflicts to other parts of the 
maritime zones, which came under their direct influence. Thus in the Bay of Bhatkal, 
the Portuguese force proceeding to Cannanore was attacked by Kunjali and his men 
for the purpose of delaying timely military assistance to the Portuguese who were 
confronted by the fighting force of Ali Raja.40
Meanwhile Kunjali and his men had also begun to translate a great share of the 
wealth that was accumulated by way of privateering and corsair activities for the 
purpose of setting up various institutions and tools of power exercise and for crea-
ting a stately structure in their domain, as Ali Raja had done in Cannanore. For this 
purpose, Kunjali had set up a fortress at Pudupattanam with storehouse of ammuni-
tions, which was eventually made to evolve into a symbol of his power and strength.41 
The liberalization of spice trade in 157042 and the consequent handing over of Indo-
-European commerce into the hands of German as well as Italian business houses and 
Portuguese private traders since 1575 reduced the rigour of coastal patrolling by the 
Portuguese on the west coast of India, causing the intensification of piratical activities 
in its coastal waters.43 During this period, the entire coastal strip of western India 
stretching from Cape Comorin to Diu was under the control of Malabar corsairs, as is 
evidenced by the German eye-witness of 1588.44 This shows that though Kunjali and 
his men kept Pudupattanam as their base, they extended spheres of their influence 
and boundaries of their power exercise up to the coast of Gujarat, implementing their 
law and justice in weak coastal zones, where the patrolling of the Portuguese was 
ineffective and irregular. The Portuguese tried to contain the increasing threat of pi-
rates by making the vessels ply in cafilas (caravans) escorted by Portuguese armada.45 
However the advantage of cafila system was benefited chiefly by the Portuguese pri-
vate traders, who used it to protect and safeguard the commodities brought from the 
eastern space of Indian Ocean to the Portuguese ports on the west coast of India.46 
Despite this protective arrangement, the thriving trade lines of the casados formed 
the chief target of Marakkar attacks during this period. 
40  F.C.Danvers, The Portuguese in India, vol.I, New Delhi, 1988, pp.528-9.
41  See the picture of Kunjali’s fortress in Luis da silveira(ed.), Livro das Plantas , Fortalezas, Cidades e 
Povoações do Estado da India Oriental, Lisboa, 1991, p.86.
42  Francisco P.Mendes da Luz, O Conselho da India, Lisboa, 1952, pp.73-4; Vicente Almeida d’Eça, Normas 
Economicas na Colonização Portuguesa ate 1808, Coimbra, 1921, chapter II. 
43  Pius Malekandathil, The Germans, the Portuguese and India, Münster, 1999, 
44  Nationalbibliothek, Vienna, Cod. 8961, fol. 891-2, letter dated 15-12-1588.
45  M.N.Pearson, Merchant and Rulers in Gujarat, the Response to the Portuguese in the Sixteenth 
Century,London, 1976, p. 46.
46  Pius Malekandathil, “The Mercantile Networks and the International Trade of Cochin”, in Rivalry and 
Conflict: European Traders and Asian Trading Networks, edited by Ernst van Veen and L.Blusse, Leiden 
University, Leiden(The Netherlands), 2006,pp.160-3.
67 
Criminality and Legitimization in Seawaters: A Study on the Pirates of Malabar 
during the Age of European Commercial Expansion (1500-1800). 
Pius Malekandathil
However it was the German and Italian merchant magnates like the Fuggers, the 
Welsers and the Rovallescas(who took up the Indo-European trade from the Portugue-
se crown on contract basis)47 who had to bear the major brunt of the corsair activities 
in the waters of coastal south western India from mid 1570s till the close of the cen-
tury. The cargo and the vessels of the Italian-German syndicates moving from Kerala 
to Lisbon were frequently attacked by corsairs both near the places of origin and ter-
minal points: While the Malabari corsairs raised threats to them from south western 
coastal India, the English and Dutch “corsairs” started looting them near the Gibralter 
particularly from mid-1580s onwards.48 In 1592 Madre de Dios one of the ships carrying 
a cargo of 7,101 quintals of pepper obtained by the agents of the Fuggers from Ke-
rala fell into the hands of the English corsairs in Atlantic and was taken to England.49 
Despite the efforts of the German contractors of Indian spice trade and the special 
intervention of the German Kaiser, who wrote letters to Queen Elizabeth in 1595 and 
1597,50 the cargo and the vessel were retained by the English. 
However, one of the major factors that differentiated the Malabari pirates from the 
English corsairs in the Atlantic or the Cilician corsairs in the Mediterranean was the 
ability of the former to build up state structures and instruments of power exercise 
out of the wealth accrued from their corsair activities. The amount of power that 
Kunjali wielded by this time was equivalent to that of a stately ruler and the Muslims 
of Malabar used to “recognize him almost like their king”.51 This was further eviden-
ced by the various power denoting titles by which Kunjali used to project himself: 
“Lord of the Arabian sea”, “Prince of Navigation” and “King of the Malabar Moors”.52 
These titles were woven not out of void but out of substance of power, which Kunjali 
accumulated by way of maritime trade and corsair activities.  With increasing stately 
47  For details see M.A.Hedwig Fitzler, “Der Anteil der deutschen an der Kolonialpolitik Philipps II von 
Spanien in Asien”, in VSWG, 28,1935,pp.243-281; Reinhard Hildebrandt, Die “Georg Fuggerischen 
Erben”:Kaufmännische Tätigkeit und sozialer Status, 1555-1600, Berlin, 1966, appendix, pp.191-196; 
Pius Malekandathil, The Germans, the Portuguese and India, pp.75-85.
48  See Joaquim Vessimo Serrao, Historia de Portugal, vol.IV, Lisboa, 1978, pp.37-8; Julian Corbett, Drake 
and the Tudor Navy, with an History of the Rise of England as a Maritime Power, 2 vols., London, 
1898; Immanuel Wallerstein, “Dutch Hegemony in the seventeenth Century World Economy”, in Dutch 
Capitalism and World Capitalism, ed.by Maurice Aymard, London, 1982, p.102.
49  Nationalbibliothek, Vienna, Cod. 8964, fols.635-6, report from Lyon, dated 16-5-1591; R.Hildebrandt, 
Die ‘Georg Fuggerischen Erben’: Kaufmännische Tätigkeit und sozialer Status, 1555-1600 , Berlin, 
1966, p.162. 
50  For details see G.Pölnitz, Fugger und Hanse: Ein Hundertjahriges Ringen um Ostsee und Nordsee, 
Tübingen, 1953, pp.222-6.
51  Antonio de Gouveia, Jornada do Arcebispo, Coimbra, 1603, p. 94; See its critical English edition Pius 
Malekanbdathil, Jornada of Dom Alexis de Menezes: A Portuguese Account of the sixteenth Century 
Malabar ,  Kochi, 2003, p.110.
52  Danvers, The Portuguese in India- Being a History of the rise and Decline of their Eastern Empire, vol.
II, p. 112.
68 
Fluxos & Riscos  n.º1, 2010
powers being added to the person of Kunjali, ‘ambassadors from the Mecca and from 
the powerful Muslim royal houses of India including that of the Mughals’53 were sent 
to his court and these wider diplomatic and political tie-ups were used by Kunjali for 
securing for himself the legitimacy and sanction needed for his political claims and for 
erasing the stigma of piracy being inscribed into his identity. 
These developments sent messages of caution and alarm to the Zamorin, who fea-
red that the moves of Kunjali were to wean the entire Muslims of Malabar away from 
him and to keep them under the control of Kunjali’s base at Pudupattanam,54 which 
ultimately would undermine his suzerainty with an alternative locus of power. The Za-
morin suspected that the Kunjali’s incipient state-building ventures with a pan-Islamic 
connections would in course of time dwarf the actual ruler, as it happened in Canna-
nore, where a full-fledged state was eventually created by the trader-cum-ruler Ali 
Raja at the expense of the Kolathiris. Apprehensive of these developments the ruler 
of Calicut himself, who was the mentor of Kunjali and his men for more than fifty ye-
ars turned against them, joining hands with the Portuguese.55 Finally, as a result of the 
joint operation of the Zamorin’s forces and the Portuguese, Kunjali was captured and 
later beheaded by the Portuguese in Goa in 1600.56 With his death and the destruction 
of his base at Pudupattanam, the guerilla warfare and organized corsair activities of 
Kunjali and his men came to an end, causing an immense loss of wealth, being accu-
mulated over decades by way of corsair activities but locked in various devices and 
structures denoting the power of Kunjali. It ultimately deprived these Muslims of the 
ability to undertake any large scale commercial activity requiring substantial capital 
and ultimately shattered their dreams to establish a stately power as well as political 
identity in the region for a considerable period of time.57
53  Antonio de Gouveia, Jornada do Arcebispo, Coimbra, 1603, p. 94; Pius Malekanbdathil, Jornada of Dom 
Alexis de Menezes, p.110.
54  It is called Marakkar Kotta by Pyrard of Laval. See Albert Gray(ed.), The Voyage of Francois Pyrard of 
Laval to the East Indies, the Maldives, the Moluccas and Brazil, vol.I,347. Diogo Couto calls it Ariole. 
Diogo Couto, Da  Asia dos feitos que os Portuguezes fizeram na Conquista e Descobrimento, Decada 
XII, liv.i, cap.xviii; livr.ii, cap.v. King of Portugal perceives Ariole as a place where “senhores vassallos 
poderosos, vezinhos de Cunhale” live and “que lhe podem dar socorro ou impidirlho que lho nao 
dem…” J.H. da Cunha Rivara, Archivo Portuguez Oriental, fasciculo 3, New Delhi, 1992, doc.76, p.245. 
This is being referred to as lying across the river of Kottakkal. Albert Gray(ed.), The Voyage of Francois 
Pyrard of Laval to the East Indies, the Maldives, the Moluccas and Brazil, vol.I,349-51.
55  Pyrard of Laval gives a rather objective picture when he says that the Kunjali Marakkar refused to 
recognize the authority of Zamorin and rebelled against him, refusing to deliver up some vessels of his 
subjects that he had taken. Kunjali had already antagonized the Nair chief of Ariole by driving him away 
from the kingdom and appropriating power over Ariole and also by cutting the nose and breasts of this 
Nair prince’s queen. Albert Gray(ed.), The Voyage of Francois Pyrard of Laval to the East Indies, the 
Maldives,, p.352. 
56  C.R.Boxer and Frazão de Vasconcelos, Andre Furtado de Mendonça(1559-1610), Lisboa, 1956, pp.21-
35; Pius Malekandathil, Jornada of Dom Alexis de Menezes, pp.477-85.
57  Pius Malekandathil, “From Merchant Capitalists to Corsairs: The Muslim Merchants of Malabar and their 
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Into the Wider World of Sea-Robbers
Kunjali Marakkar’s death did not put an end, however, to the activities of Malabar 
corsairs. Instead it gave a drastic turn to the entire programme of corsairing, as a lar-
ge number of Muslim sea-farers trained in coastal warfare as well as guerilla fighting 
and till then held together into a relatively disciplined corsair-cum-merchant band 
under Kunjali got scattered along the west coast of India with Kunjali’s execution, 
causing many of them to emerge as full-fledged sea-robbers. They started attacking 
the Portuguese vessels rather frequently. Some of them, while continuing their cor-
sair activities in coastal zones frequented by the Portuguese, started also to offer 
their service as sailors and trading intermediaries for the other European Companies, 
feeding their commercial ventures, as Musa Attale did for the English in 1615.58 The 
friendship between the corsairs of Malabar and the English must have been a part of 
the tactics to forge a commercial partnership between the forces, which opposed the 
Portuguese trade system.59 
Meanwhile the Malabari corsairs, being released from the formats of an organized 
politico-economic activity with the disappearance of Kunjali,60 intensified their atta-
cks on the navigational lines of the wealthy Portuguese casado traders returning from 
the eastern space of Indian Ocean. They used to attack the vessels of casados, torture 
or execute them and take away all valuables from them, which they turned into cargo 
for their trading activities. Very often the robbed items from the Portuguese private 
traders and attractive wares obtained from their vessels were sold by these corsairs 
in the market of Calicut, as is testified by Pietro della Valle in 1624.61 
The Malabar corsairs settled along the vast coastline stretching from Cangelotte( 
Kaniyiramkodu near Kasarkodu)62 to Calicut and their core area was around Kotta ri-
ver. Muttungal, a port located in the midway between Cannanore and Calicut was one 
of the major havens for these corsairs, who were predominantly Muslims but ruled by 
a Nair chieftain.63 Chombal and Vadakara were the other two major ports dominated 
by corsairs in the northern and southern parts of Muttungal.64 The corsairs had to pay 
Responses to Portuguese Maritime Trade Expansion(1498-1600)”,in Portuguese Studies Review, vol.12, 
no.1, Winter-Spring, 200-5, pp.92-3.
58  William Foster(ed.), The Voyage of Nicholas Downton to the East Indies:1614-1615, London, 1939, p.25
59  Pius Malekandathil, Maritime India: Trade, Religion and Polity in the Indian Ocean, pp.138-9.
60  After the beheading of Kunjali Marakkar, nobody was appointed to that post of naval admiral by the 
Zamorin. However the son of Kunjali used to change his residence periodically between Pudupattanam 
( Marakkar Kotta) and Chombal.  Albert Gray(ed.), The Voyage of Francois Pyrard of Laval to the East 
Indies, the Maldives,p.357.
61  Edward Grey(ed.), The Travels of Pietro Della Valle in India, vol.II, New Delhi, 1991, p.362.
62  Albert Gray(ed.), The Voyage of Francois Pyrard of Laval, vol.I, p.344; Livros das Monções, II, p.352.
63  Albert Gray(ed.), The Voyage of Francois Pyrard of Laval, vol.I, pp.336-7.
64  Ibid., p.338.
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a share of their booty appropriated from the Portuguese vessels to their local rulers 
of these regions, besides to Zamorin and Kunjali Marakkar, while the rest was equally 
divided.65  Though the Portuguese repeatedly tried to conquer these four centres of 
corsair concentration in Malabar,66 they still continued to be the havens for pirates for 
a considerable period of time because of the support that they used to get from the 
local rulers in return for the booty that they often shared with the latter.  
Eventually with the entry of different European powers into the waters of Indian 
Ocean and consequent increase in the volume of maritime trade, the number of cor-
sairs and their operations got considerably intensified. In the beginning of the seven-
teenth century Pyrard de Laval observed that ‘every year many thousand men used 
to leave the Zamorin’s country to do their robberies on the sea…’67. Meanwhile the 
Malabari pirates also started traveling in caravans and in large numbers, probably 
for the purpose of effectively confronting the larger European vessels equipped with 
guns and artilleries. Jean Baptiste Tavernier says that these corsairs habitually sailed 
in squadrons of 10 to 15  with 200 to 250 men on board each. There were also occa-
sions when the Malabari corsairs resorted to 25 to 30 vessels, as it happened when 
they attacked the English captain Clerc.68 Abbé Carré who traveled along the coast of 
India during the period between 1672 and 1674  says that attacks from Sangani or the 
Malabar pirates were frequent in the Gulf of Cambay.69
Abbé Carré says that Kotta, near Tellicherry was the headquarters of a considerable 
number of Malabari pirates.70 From Kotta, they extended piratical activities to entire 
west coast of India with the northern terminal point being Gulf of Cambay.71 Abbé Car-
ré also refers to the island of l’arrous (meaning land with thieves) which was located 
7 miles south of Gogha and from where the inhabitants fled en masse to other safer 
places because of frequent raids of Malabari pirates. 72 The depopulation and deser-
tion of the island of l’arrous due to corsair attacks has parallel in the Mediterranean, 
where the island of Pianosa located near Corsica and Lisbos was totally depopulated 
and the edifices and castles demolished because of frequent attacks from Barbary cor-
sairs during this period.73 However, in the Indian Ocean Gogha seems to have occupied 
a singular position as being the major halting center for the Malabari pirates moving 
65  Ibid., pp.345-6.
66  Ibid., p.349.
67  Ibid., p.357.
68  V.Ball(ed.), Travels in India by Jean Baptiste Tavernier, vol.I, London, 1889, pp.177-8.
69  Abbé Carré, The Travels of Abbe Carre in India and the Near East 1672 to 1674, tran. By Lady Fawcett 
and ed.by Charles Fawcett and Richard Burn, New Delhi, 1990, p.130.
70  Ibid., p. 701.
71  Ibid., pp.130; 180;186;201.
72  Ibid., p.138.
73  Ibid., p.22.
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between Malabar and Cambay. While referring to these Muslims of Gogha, Abbé Carré 
comments that they used to live haphazardly sometimes at war, sometimes as bandits 
and sometimes as sea men, without any rule to guide them.74 This seems to epitomi-
ze the very nature of the corsairs in operation on the west coast of India during this 
period.   
Vazhunnavar of Vadakara and Strategies of Legitimization 
Abbé Carré states that Vadakara located about 13 miles south of Tellicherry was the 
home of the richest pirates on the Malabar coast,75which fact was further testified by 
several other European sources. He also refers to the Sheikh of Vadakara as having 
linkages with corsair activities.76  However the many of the European sources inclu-
ding the Dutch writings refer to a local Hindu chieftain, Vazhunnavar of Vadakara, 
as the chief protector and lord of pirates in northern Malabar in the second half of 
seventeenth and first half of eighteenth centuries.77 
Both Vazhunnavar of Vadakara and Ali Raja of Cannanore used to compete themsel-
ves to control the activities of Mappilas of Dharmapattanam, who combined in them-
selves the roles of traders and pirates.  However the Mappilas of Dharmapattanam, 
who were linked very much with the corsairs of Vadakara were bitter enemies of Ali 
Raja refusing themselves to be subjugated to the latter. 78 In 1682 Ali Raja tried to ap-
propriate the title of Karthavu(chieftain) of Dharmappattanam, by assassinating the 
reigning chieftain, probably with a view to controlling the corsairs of Dharmapatta-
nam for the purpose of feeding his trading networks.79 However the rightful successor 
mobilizing help from his men and the pirates of Vadakara managed to expel Ali Raja 
from Dharmapattanam,80 allowing it to remain as a terrain of corsairs as ever.
It was the increasing movement of commodities by various European commercial 
companies that intensified corsair phenomena on the coast of northern Kerala du-
ring this period. The chief reason for the emergence of Kotta, Dharmapattanam and 
74  Ibid.
75  Ibid., p.703.
76  Ibid., p.703.
77  Albert Gray(ed.), The Voyage of Francois Pyrard of Laval, vol.I, pp.344-8; Abbé Carré, The Travels of 
Abbe Carre in India and the Near East, p.703; Alexander Hamilton, A New account of the East Indies, 
Being the Observations and Remarks of Capt. Alexander Hamilton,  vol.II, New Delhi, 1995, pp.301-5; 
Vazhunnavar of Vadakara is equated with the raja of Kadathanadu. 
78  Binu M.John, The Ali Rajas of Cannanore: Status and Identity at the Interface of Commercial and 
Political Expansion 1663-1723, Unpublished Ph. D. thesis submitted to Department of History, Leiden 
University(the Netherlands), 2007,p.162.
79  Ibid., p.167 ; English Factories(1678-84), p. 394.
80  Binu M.John, The Ali Rajas of Cannanore: Status and Identity at the Interface of Commercial and 
Political Expansion., p.167.
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Vadakara as the havens of pirates was that these places were located on the main 
strategic points of the European navigational lines in Kerala. In fact these bases were 
situated in the close vicinity of the French factory of Mahe, English factory of Telli-
cherry and the Dutch factory of Cannanore. Vessels moving to these factories were 
attacked and looted by these corsairs with much ease, as the patrolling of the coast 
by European forces was very irregular and inefficient at this point of time. 
With the increasing accumulation of wealth from corsair activities, Vazhunnanvar of 
Vadakara also wanted to have a social status and position corresponding to his wealth. 
He wanted to get the stigma of being the lord of pirates erased and to make himself 
acceptable before the world of law as a political ruler, for which he made strenuous 
efforts to keep himself associated with the Dutch, who represented the realm of 
legitimacy during those years. As a part of this attempt, Vazhunnavar expressed his 
readiness to provide the Dutch company with a trade settlement and a fort built in his 
land(Vadakara) at his own cost. He realized that such a move would clear his land of 
pirates and would give a clean chit to his political credibility, besides putting forward 
a legal claim to the profit from regional trade.81 He had already emerged so much as a 
“man of prowess” in the region by this time that even Kolathiri requested Vazhunnan-
var of Vadakara in 1687 to interfere in and settle the conflicts that appeared among 
the princes of Kolathunadu in matters of assertion of power in the region. In 1701 the 
commander Abraham Wink wrote to XVII Heren that the then Vazhunanar was a very 
respectable person and was very much different from his ancestors, who had earlier 
been patrons of pirates.82
The foregoing discussions throw some light into the nature and content of the cor-
sair activities attributed to the Malabari sea-farers, who combined in themselves the 
roles of pirates, corsairs, guerrilla warriors and traders. The Portuguese using the 
notions of mare clausum developed certain legal perceptions by which the nature 
of criminality in the waters of Indian Ocean was re-defined and everyone who con-
ducted trade in the Indian Ocean resisting their supremacy was viewed as a pirate. 
Their perceptions of pirates included principally seafarers involved in privateering, or 
in corsairing or in corsair-cum-trading activities with elements of guerrilla fighting. 
With the shifting of commercial activities from Cochin to Calicut, the Marakkar tra-
ders combined in themselves elements of guerrilla fighting, making themselves fit for 
serving the privateering needs of the Zamorin. Under Kunjali Marakkar, the corsairs 
and Muslim traders were transformed into relatively organized and disciplined band of 
81  Letter of Kunju Kurupp the regedor of Vazhunnavar quoted by Binu M John, The Ali Rajas of Cannanore: 
Status and Identity at the Interface of Commercial and Political Expansion, p .174.
82  Ibid., p.174.
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guerrilla fighters ready to execute the command of the Zamorin both for attacking the 
vessels of the Portuguese and to create space for transshipping cargo to Red Sea ports. 
Kunjali succeeded in linking their ventures with those of Ali Raja, who carved out a 
stately structure at Cannanore out of the wealth accrued by controlling the trade with 
Red Sea, channelized through Maldives. Eventually Kunjali Marakkar also transferred 
wealth accumulated out of corsair-cum-trading activities for setting up instruments 
and tools of power exercise at Pudupattanam, besides appropriating for themselves 
power-denoting titles. 
The entire process seems to have been to appropriate a social and political status 
befitting their wealth. These political developments were meant to create a new 
identity for Kunjali Marakkar that would make him acceptable before the legitimate 
world and thus to ably resist the Portuguese commercial expansion. However the 
Zamorin suspecting the development of a parallel power center right under his nose, 
joined hands with the Portuguese to capture Kunjali and facilitated the Portuguese 
to carry out his execution, shattering the dreams of the Marakkar trading cum-corsair 
group to set up a state. The execution of Kunjali led to the loosening and scattering 
of the trader-cum-corsairs from the organizational frame controlled by a leader to 
different parts of coastal western India as disorganized guerrilla warriors, where they 
began to get engaged in full-fledged piracy. Despite the world of criminality, within 
which they operated, there was an increasing desire among these pirates to obtain ac-
ceptability and legitimacy by getting linked with legitimate rulers. Such a move made 
the pirates of Vadakara get linked with the Vazhunnavar, who in turn tried to legitimi-
ze his position as a man of prowess by getting himself associated with the Dutch. By 
offering political and commercial help to the Dutch, the Vazhunnavar tried to project 
himself as a legitimate ruler of the region and tried to erase the stigma that had fal-
len upon them for years as protector and lord of pirates of northern Malabar. We find 
that participation in political processes and involvement in state formation ventures 
were increasingly resorted to by the corsairs and pirates to legitimize their position 
and to project themselves before world of law including the European commercial 
companies in an acceptable and justifiable way. The legitimization processes resor-
ted to by them seem to have secured the political acceptability and credibility that 
they desired for the restructuring of their new identities, and we find that prominent 
politico-economic players of the times like the Ottoman officials of Mecca and Mughal 
ruler Akbar sending ambassadors to the court of Kunjali by the end of sixteenth cen-
tury while the Dutch eagerly seeking commercial and political partnerships with the 
former lord of pirates, the Vazhunnavar of Vadakara, by the end of the seventeenth 
century.  Thus it was their ability to convert the wealth accumulated from corsair-
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-cum-trading activities into political assets that helped them to get constructed for 
themselves an image by which they were de-linked from the world of criminality, but 
made acceptable to others as legitimate rulers or possessors and sharers of power in 
their respective areas of control. 
